Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Artis Carroll, Jr. by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-2-2019 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Artis Carroll, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Artis Carroll, Jr." (2019). 2019 Decisions. 286. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/286 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-102        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3368 
___________ 
 
PENNSYLVANIA 
 
v. 
 
ARTIS C. CARROLL, JR. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
                   for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Criminal No. 5-18-cr-00396-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 14, 2019 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, Jr., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 2, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION*  
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 
Artis Carroll, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals a remand order issued by the United 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
Carroll filed a notice of removal of criminal proceedings brought against him in 
state court.  He sought removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443, which allows removal in 
certain cases involving civil rights, and § 1455, which sets forth the procedures for the 
removal of state criminal proceedings.  Carroll asserted that he was subjected to racial 
discrimination while he was a student at Millersville University.  Although the notice is 
somewhat unclear, Carroll stated that he was suspended for alleged violations of the 
Student Code of Conduct, that he refused to leave campus, and that he was charged with 
defiant trespass in 2015.  He stated that he then violated the condition of his bail 
prohibiting him from returning to campus and was charged again with defiant trespass.  
He appears to state that he was acquitted of the first charge but convicted of the second.   
Carroll claimed that he was denied the University’s services on account of his race 
and that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred his prosecution because the request that he 
leave campus was made for racial reasons.  Carroll also alleged that he returned to 
campus after his sentence and suspension expired and sought re-admittance to finish his 
degree, and that he was charged in 2018 with stalking by communication and harassment 
by communication.  He asserted that these charges were racially motivated and filed to 
deny him services at the University.    
The District Court ruled that Carroll’s conclusory allegations were insufficient to 
sustain removal under § 1443, and stated that, even if he had met the applicable standard, 
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his removal notice was untimely under § 1455(b).  The District Court remanded the 
action to state court and this appeal followed.    
 An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal, unless the case was removed pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443.  28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d).  We have jurisdiction to review the remand order to the extent Carroll 
asserted that removal was proper under § 1443.  Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 
(3d Cir. 1997).  We exercise plenary review over legal questions related to a remand 
order.  See Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (2000).  
 As recognized by the District Court, a defendant seeking to remove a state 
criminal prosecution under § 1443(1) must show “both (1) that he is being deprived of 
rights guaranteed by a federal law ‘providing for . . . equal civil rights’; and (2) that he is 
‘denied or cannot enforce that right in the courts’ of the state.”  Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047 
(quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)).  Under the first requirement, 
removal must be based upon a law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of 
racial equality, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See id. (discussing Rachel).  Under 
the second requirement, a denial or inability to enforce the right in state court must be 
manifest in a formal expression of state law.  Id. at 1047-48.  However, in narrow 
circumstances, a firm prediction that a defendant would be denied his federal right in 
state court might be made even absent a discriminatory state law.  Id. at 1048.  
Although Carroll invokes the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he has not shown that he 
will be denied or cannot enforce his rights in state court.  Carroll relies on Rachel, where 
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the Supreme Court allowed removal where defendants alleged that state trespass charges 
had been brought against them after they were ordered to leave restaurants solely on 
account of their race and they refused, and the Court had held that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 protects those who refuse to obey such an order from prosecution.  384 U.S. at 804-
05.  The Court stated that in these narrow circumstances the pendency of the prosecutions 
enabled the federal court to clearly predict that the defendants would be denied or could 
not enforce in the state courts “the right to be free of any ‘attempt to punish’ them for 
protected activity.”  Id. at 805.  Unlike in Rachel, Carroll’s allegations do not show that 
he engaged in protected activity.  He refused to leave campus and thereafter returned to 
campus after he had been suspended.  A federal court cannot clearly predict based on his 
allegations that he will be denied a right to be free of prosecution for protected activity in 
state court.1 
Finally, to the extent Carroll also sought removal under the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which allows removal in certain extraordinary circumstances, Davis, 107 
 F.3d at 1047 n.4, Carroll did not show that such circumstances exist here. 
Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
1Carroll also refers to § 1443(2) in his removal notice, but that provision is inapplicable 
as it is available to federal officers and those assisting them in the performance of their 
official duties.  City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 815 (1966).  In light of 
these conclusions, we do not consider the additional ruling below that the removal notice 
was untimely. 
